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Confronting the Dark Side of Caesar’s Gallic Wars
Kurt a. raaflaub
Abstract: Julius Caesar’s military achievements, described in his Gallic War, are 
monumental; so are the atrocities his army committed in slaughtering or enslaving entire 
nations. He stands accused of genocide. For today’s readers, including students and 
teachers, this poses problems. It raises questions, not least about Caesar’s place in the Latin 
curriculum. Applying modern definitions of “genocide,” is he guilty as accused? If so, is 
it justified to condemn him of a crime that was recognized as such only recently? Without 
condoning Caesar’s actions, this paper seeks fuller understanding by contextual analysis, 
placing them in the context of Roman—and ancient (if not almost universal)—customs of 
imperial warfare. It emphasizes the complexity of historical persons and events, juxtaposing 
Caesar the brutal conqueror to Caesar the clement victor, who established clemency among a 
ruler’s cardinal virtues.
 
Key words: Caesar, The Gallic War, conquest of Gaul, war atrocities, genocide, Cicero, 
Rome’s brutal wars, clemency, teaching Caesar.
1. The Massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri: Caesar’s Worst War Atrocity in Gaul
To lead the readers in medias res and help them gauge the scope and nature of the war 
atrocities Caesar and his army committed in the course of the Gallic War, I begin by 
discussing what is probably the worst example.1 According to Caesar’s report, in the winter 
of 56/55 bce two German nations, the Usipetes and Tencteri, crossed the lower Rhine into 
Gaul, escaping the harassment of the dominant Suebi.2 They spent the winter in villages 
whose owners they had killed or expelled. By the spring, welcomed by Celtic and German 
nations living along the Rhine, they moved south. These nations included clients of the 
Treveri who maintained close contacts with Germans across the Rhine and whose loyalty 
Caesar had already found questionable. Moreover, his earlier experiences with the German 
warlord Ariovistus, whom he had defeated in 58, and deeply ingrained Roman fears and 
prejudices had predisposed him against Germans. Hence, he believed, these German 
migrants could not be trusted and were likely to cause troubles among the fickle Gauls.3 
From his first encounter with envoys of the two nations Caesar portrays their 
leaders, like Ariovistus, as utterly arrogant and treacherous. In negotiations for a peaceful 
settlement Caesar demanded that the Germans leave Gaul but tried to make this more 
palatable to them by suggesting a union with the Ubii, his allies across the Rhine, which 
would enable all of them better to resist the Suebi. Twice they requested more time for  
their response, which hardened his suspicion that they were not negotiating in good faith.  
So did an unprovoked attack by their cavalry during a truce. He detained their leaders, who 
1  More examples will be described in section 4. For definition and discussion of the concept of “genocide,” see 
section 6. Unspecified source references are to the Bellum Gallicum (BG). BC = Bellum civile. Translations from 
Caesar’s works are taken from the Landmark Julius Caesar (Raaflaub 2017). 
This paper was offered in earlier versions at the 2017 Summer Institute and the 2020 Annual Meeting of the 
Classical Association of New England, at the 2020 Annual Meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians, and in 
2018 and 2019 at various universities and colleges in Germany and the USA. I owe thanks for useful feedback and 
good advice to audiences at these events and particularly to Elizabeth Baer, Deborah Boedeker, Joseph Frechette, 
Ian Hochberg, Jon E. Lendon, Dominic Machado, Amy Martin-Nelson, Hans-Friedrich Mueller, Aaron Seider, 
Karin Suzedail, Mark Thatcher, David Yates, and the anonymous referee of the NECJ. The paper received its final 
shape in the summer and fall of 2020 in the USA. This is the perspective underlying allusions to “our time” and 
“our country.” I welcome readers’ comments.
2  “Nation” translates civitas; for the advantage of using this term vs. “tribe” or “people,” see Pelling 2011: 211.
3  4.1.1–2; 4.4–6; Treveri: 2.24.4–5; 3.11.1–2. Ariovistus: 1.30–54. For Roman fears of German invaders, see 
below at n. 166. 
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had come to apologize for the incident, and immediately went on the attack, completely 
surprising and terrifying the Germans:4 
Their fear was obvious from their screams and chaotic running around.  Our 
soldiers, spurred on by the betrayal of the previous day, burst into the camp where 
those of the enemy who could quickly seize their weapons resisted for a short time... 
Meanwhile the masses of other persons—women and children, for the Germans 
had left home and crossed the Rhine with their entire families—began to flee in 
every direction. Caesar sent the cavalry to run them down. When the Germans 
heard shouts rising behind them and saw that their people were being slaughtered, 
they threw their arms away… and rushed out of the camp. When they reached the 
place where the Rhine and Meuse run together, they lost any remaining hope of 
getting away. A great number of them were killed. The rest threw themselves into 
the river and perished there, overcome by panic, exhaustion, and the power of the 
current. Every last one of our men survived, and only a few were wounded.5 
The number given for the enemy (430,000) certainly is far too high—a feature typical of 
ancient war reports to make the danger and the victor’s achievement appear even larger.6 But 
the number does not matter here; nor is it important that parts of the two nations survived, 
because more escaped the massacre than Caesar was told or because they were not present 
at the scene of the final massacre or had never participated in the migration to Gaul. What 
matters is the cold-blooded attack on an unsuspecting enemy with the undisguised intention 
of destroying two entire nations, men, women, and children, and the general’s gloating about 
having achieved this without any loss among his soldiers.
This drastic episode drew the attention of Caesar’s enemies in Rome. They 
convinced the Senate to appoint a committee to investigate Caesar’s policies in Gaul, 
although it is unknown whether this committee was actually sent off.7 Cato the Younger 
even demanded that Caesar be extradited to the victims as an atonement for the crime 
he had committed by arresting envoys and violating a truce—accusations that Caesar’s 
narrative carefully refutes. Cato’s proposal was, of course, influenced by partisanship but 
not unprecedented; presumably he chose this moment for his attack because Caesar’s action 
more than any other seemed to violate even the loose Roman norms on such matters.8 In 
view of the magnitude of Caesar’s victory, his supporters easily suppressed Cato’s demand.9 
Yet the controversy continues to this day: scholars critical of Caesar’s methods in his Gallic 
wars have focused not least on this episode to accuse him even of genocide.
2. The Balance Sheet of Caesar’s Conquests: Questions and Approaches
The genocide accusation, featuring in recent research on genocide, was picked up by Nico 
Roymans, a Dutch archaeologist, who found in a dry riverbed in far northern Gaul, in a 
setting that seems to fit Caesar’s description, a large deposit of skeletal evidence, including 
4  4.7–13.
5  4.14–15. 
6  See Brunt 1971: 694–97; Henige 1998; Stangl 2008; Pelling 2011: 211, 253. On the importance of numbers, 
see below at nn. 112, 125.
7  Suetonius, Divus Julius 24.3.
8  See Powell 1998: 124–32 for Caesar’s highly defensive narrative, and below at n. 88 for “norms of war.” 
Precedents: Pelling 2011: 252.
9  Plutarch, Cato Minor 51.1–5; Caesar 22.1–7; Suetonius, Divus Iulius 24.3; Drogula 2019: 199–200. Gelzer 
1968: 132 n.1 suggests that, reacting to these attacks when writing his full report, Caesar may have “strengthened 
the allusions to the malicious breaches of faith by the Germans.” 
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women and children.10 For various reasons, this identification seems questionable.11 Yet the 
issue of genocide must be taken seriously and forces us to confront what I call “the dark side” 
of Caesar’s Gallic wars.
 So does the balance sheet of Caesar’s nine-year conquest of Gaul. It is most 
depressing.  According to Plutarch and Appian, one million Celts died, another million were 
enslaved.12 Casualties among the noncombatant population probably were higher but cannot 
be estimated more precisely. In his triumph in 46 Caesar listed the number of soldiers killed 
in all his battles (thus not only in Gaul) as 1,192,000.13 Despite the numbers Caesar gives of 
Gallic military levies and losses, it is impossible to estimate the population of Gaul in Caesar’s 
time with any precision. Reasonable estimates by modern scholars run up to 8 or even 10 or 
12 million. If this is correct, the percentage of casualties mentioned by the sources amounts to 
between 16 and 25% of the total.14 This by far surpasses even the figures of the two countries 
most affected by World War II, Germany (c. 9%) and the Soviet Union (c. 13.7%).15 To 
calculate Caesar’s losses is impossible because he rarely gives those figures.16 
 It was not only the Roman sword that inflicted death on the Gallic population. 
Large parts starved to death because the harvests were confiscated or destroyed and their 
settlements and farmsteads burned, or they froze to death when the legions drove them 
out of their settlements in winter and burned down buildings, villages, and towns. Huge 
forests were systematically felled because Caesar’s army needed firewood and lumber to 
build fortifications, bridges, and entire fleets, or tried to prevent nations from using them 
as refuges. Herds of cattle and pigs were driven from the fields and devoured.17 About an 
episode in 53 Caesar writes: “Even if for the moment some people succeeded in remaining 
hidden, it seemed that after the army’s departure they would still necessarily perish from 
complete lack of supplies.”18 The Roman army’s march through enemy territories turned 
these into landscapes of war and terror.19 Ernst Badian writes: “Requisitions of food and 
punitive devastations completed a human, economic, and ecological disaster probably 
unequalled until the conquest of the Americas.”20 The material and financial exploitation of 
Gaul also had a disastrous, though often underestimated, impact on the population.21
My concern in this paper is how to assess the accumulation of violence that, from 
our perspective, is highly disturbing and has not received the attention it demands. It poses 
a serious problem that I formulate here from a teacher’s perspective, although it should 
affect every reader. How do we come to terms with Caesar’s actions in view of the values 
we may hold and want to pass on to the next generation? How do we deal with an author 
10  Roymans and Fernández-Götz 2015; Quesada-Sanz 2015. The final excavation report has not yet been 
published. Genocide research: n. 67 below.
11  Raaflaub and Ramsey 2017: 31–33.
12  Plutarch, Caesar 15.5; Appian, Roman History 4 (Celtic Wars) 1.2.
13  Pliny, Natural History 7.92.
14  For details, including the estimates for the population of Gaul, see Will 1992: 96-98. For comparison, the war 
dead on both sides of the American civil war numbered at least 620,000 out of a combined population in 1861 of 31 
million (that is, 2%).
15  Germany: c. 6.3 million out of a total population of 69.3 million within Germany’s 1937 borders. Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties#Nazi_Germany (accessed March 19, 2021); Overmans 
2004; Overy 2015. Soviet Union: almost 27 million out of a total population of c. 197 million in June 1941. Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties_of_the_Soviet_Union#Total_population_losses (accessed 
March 19, 2021); Ellman and Maksudov 1994; Haynes 2003. 
16  Exceptions: 6.44.1 (two cohorts: c. 600); 7.51.4 (700); BC 3.71.1–2 (960); 3.99.1 (200). The ambush of 15 
cohorts (more than 5,000 men) by the Eburones in 54 (below at n. 52) was Caesar’s highest loss in all his wars. 
The narrative implies that Roman casualties at Bibracte (1.26.5) and the Sabis River (2.25) were high. Very low 
numbers, contrasted with high enemy losses, are presented with pride (4.15.3; BC 3.53.1–2; 3.99.1, 4).
17  Based on Will 1992: 98.
18  6.43.3.
19  Hill and Wileman 2002; Will 1992: 98.
20  Badian 2012: 758. I thank Michael Meckler for this reference. 
21  See below at n. 24.
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who perpetrated these actions and describes them without any reluctance? Although there 
are good reasons to find Caesar’s writings interesting and valuable, this problem compels us 
to ask: how do we justify teaching Caesar as one of the most important authors in our Latin 
curriculum? I intend in this paper to suggest some ways to tackle this problem and to make 
positive use of a very negative reality.22 
I will first sketch Caesar’s situation in 58 and the political necessities under which 
he operated in Gaul (section 3). I will then establish in more detail the sad record of the 
atrocities he committed there, summarizing the most relevant events (4) and assessing the 
overall picture of Caesar the brutal conqueror (5). Looking at the authoritative definitions 
of “genocide” and “war crimes,” I will conclude that they are clearly applicable to several 
of Caesar’s war atrocities, although I will also point out the difficulty of condemning Caesar 
of crimes that were recognized as such only two millennia later (6). I shall argue that the 
simplest solution for dealing with this problem, namely to eliminate Caesar from the Latin 
curriculum, is perhaps not the best (7). I will then explain Caesar’s atrocities in their broad 
historical context (8), and emphasize the complexity of historical persons and events, 
juxtaposing Caesar the brutal conqueror to Caesar the clement victor (9). In concluding, I 
will consider Caesar’s actions even more broadly in the context of the function of genocide 
in ancient warfare (10). In a brief appendix I will address the issue of “migrants” that has 
special significance for readers familiar with some of the most urgent challenges in our  
own time.
I expect that some readers will criticize me for trying to find excuses for Caesar’s 
actions. I therefore declare now once and for all, with utmost emphasis, so-to-speak in capital 
letters, that I do not intend to play down, condone, or explain away Caesar’s atrocities. 
Analyzing is not the same as condoning. When dealing with historical events  
and persons, we must be able to look at the full picture from all sides. In this sense, I ask  
my readers to consider this paper an invitation for a continuing discussion.
3. The Background: Caesar in 58 bcE and the Helvetian Campaign
Caesar’s situation at the beginning of 58 bce was dire.23 True, with the support of his allies, 
Pompey and Crassus, he had in 59 reached the consulship. He had seen to it, as promised, 
that their primary political agendas were realized. For himself he had secured five-year 
governorships over three provinces that in a broad arc covered the entire north of Italy: 
Transalpine Gaul (roughly modern Provence), Cisalpine Gaul (the Po Valley from the Alps 
to the Adriatic), and Illyricum (along the north-eastern coast of the Adriatic). But he had 
paid a steep price for all this: his bills had met stiff resistance in the Senate and been passed 
in the assembly only through much violence, his reputation among Rome’s senators was 
lower than ever, his leading opponents threatened to drag him through the courts as soon as 
he was no longer protected by official immunity, and he was in deep financial trouble. When 
he assumed his governorships, he was desperately looking for an opportunity to fight a major 
war, mainly for two reasons. 
One was his need for money. Caesar lacked substantial family wealth and was 
notoriously indebted. Urbanization was spreading rapidly in gold- and metal-rich Gaul, and 
the sack of towns promised great rewards. In addition, Italy was hungry for ever more slaves, 
and the slave traders and booty merchants following Roman armies offered instant profits.24 
I cannot discuss here the material and financial plundering of Gaul that enriched Caesar, his 
officers, his army and supporters, Roman officials and senators, and the population at large. 
Nor shall I talk about the building program in Rome that Caesar financed with the gold, 
booty, and slaves of Gaul. Caesar himself mentions the slaves and rarely the plunder, Hirtius 
offers brief insights, and later sources summarize the essentials.25 Suffice it to quote Wolfgang 
22  See further section 7.
23  For Caesar’s career, see Gelzer 1968; Meier 1995; Goldsworthy 2006; Gruen 2009.
24  2.33.6–7; Rowan 2013, 2017; Ralston 2017. Generally: Will 1992: 66–72. 
25  Plutarch, Caesar 15.5, 20.2–3; Suetonius, Divus Julius 26.2–3, 54.2; Dio Cassius 42.49; 43.39.4. Slaves: 2.33.7; 
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Will who writes sarcastically: “We can’t read Caesar’s thoughts but we can read his balances. 
When the governor left his provinces, both the population of Gaul and the gold price in Italy 
had fallen by a quarter.”26
More important for this paper’s purposes is Caesar’s ambition to emulate Pompey. 
After conducting far-reaching campaigns in the east and finally defeating Rome’s nemesis, 
Mithradates VI of Pontus, Pompey had in the late 60s reshaped Rome’s eastern frontier. By 
annexing vast territories to create new provinces and establishing dependent principalities 
(client kingdoms), he had created a broad security cordon.27 He thereby set the bar of public 
accomplishment at a new level. Whoever in the future wanted to compete for a position 
of pre-eminence in the senatorial aristocracy had to establish a comparable record of 
achievement. More than ever, the path to the top led through success on the battlefield. 
In 56, only three years into the Gallic wars, debates began in the Senate about 
the renewal of Caesar’s governorships. In his speech About the Consular Provinces, Cicero 
formulated a striking vision. Its outline, I am certain, was conveyed to him by one of Caesar’s 
agents. In essence, Cicero argued, through his conquests and new provinces Pompey had 
created a safe boundary for Rome in the east. Caesar was pursuing the same goal in the 
north. By expanding the frontier to the ocean, taming the fierce and war-hungry nations in 
Gaul, and bringing them under Roman control, he was establishing a safe, peaceful, and 
well-ordered world.28 Cicero was tapping here into the Roman ideology of what moderns 
call “defensive imperialism,” that is, the justification of imperial expansion with the need 
to enhance Roman security. Another aspect of this ideology is summarized by Cicero’s 
statement, “Our people has now gained power over the whole world by defending its 
allies.”29 This was precisely how Caesar justified his intervention in Gaul.30
 At any rate, Gaul was interesting. It offered opportunities. Wars had been fought 
with Gallic nations in and near the province of Transalpine Gaul until the late 60s. Further 
wars were expected, but then the threat subsided. In 60, Cicero wrote about a consul who 
expected to be appointed governor of one of the Gallic provinces, [He] “is an excellent 
consul. I have only one criticism: he is not over-happy at the news of peace in Gaul. He wants 
a triumph, I suppose.”31 The right to celebrate a triumph, with a magnificent parade of the 
army through the city and up to the Capitol to render thanks to Jupiter, was the greatest 
honor the Senate could bestow on a victorious general.32 Caesar had this ambition too. 
Forced by the machinations of opponents who wanted to prevent his consulship, Caesar had 
in 60 chosen this office over a triumph for victories in Spain. He was determined not to miss a 
second opportunity. Controlling through his provinces the entire northern frontier, he trusted 
that somewhere troubles would erupt that would justify his intervention. And so they did.
Plans of the Helvetii (a Celtic nation living in today’s Switzerland) to migrate to 
the west of Gaul had been known before, but when news arrived in Rome in the spring 
of 58 that they had actually set a firm date to assemble, Caesar pounced. He rushed to 
Genava (Geneva, on the border between his Transalpine province and Helvetian territory), 
mobilized troops, and denied the Helvetians’ request to migrate peacefully through the 
province. After trying in vain to break through Caesar’s barricades, they changed their 
route and avoided the province altogether, depriving Caesar of a cause for war. But he was 
not to be denied. He hurried to Cisalpine Gaul, returned with five legions, and crossed into 
3.16.4; 7.89.5. Plunder: 7.11.4–9, 28.4; 8.24.4; Hirtius, 8.4.1, 5.3, 24.4, 27.5, 36.5. See Rambaud 1966: 168–72; 
Will 1992: 98–104.
26  Will 1992: 66 (my trans.).
27  On Pompey’s career, see Greenhalgh 1981; Seager 2002. Mithradates: Mayor 2010.
28  Cicero, De provinciis consularibus 19–20, 30–34. 
29  Cicero, Republic 3.34–36, esp. 35 (trans. Harris). On defensive imperialism, see Harris 1979: 163–254. 
30  1.11.
31  Cicero, Letters to Atticus 1.20.5. Trans. Shackleton Bailey 1978a (modified). Here and elsewhere content 
in square brackets condenses wording that does not need to be quoted in full, or makes the quote better 
understandable.
32  See Beard 2007 and discussion below at n. 125.
59
independent Gaul. There he collected complaints of locals about Helvetian transgressions 
and was duly asked for help by the Aedui, long-standing Roman allies. Moreover, he 
claimed, the Helvetians’ plan to settle right next to the Roman province would expose 
it to intolerable danger by a most warlike and aggressive hostile nation.33 (Probably few 
of Caesar’s readers knew enough about Gallic geography to realize that the Helvetians’ 
intended settlement area, on the Atlantic coast north of the Garonne, was more than 200 
miles from the province’s border, while in their previous homeland they had been its direct 
neighbors!)
Thus armed with plenty of justifications that to any Roman must have sounded 
compelling enough, Caesar embarked on the Helvetian war. Act One consisted of the 
unprovoked massacre of the Tigurini, one of the Helvetian tribes, who had played a part 
in defeats inflicted by the Cimbri and Teutoni upon Roman armies some fifty years before. 
Caesar presents this as an act of revenge for a long-ago defeat in which a consul and an 
ancestor of Caesar’s wife had been killed—Rome’s and Caesar’s personal honor were now 
restored.34 In Act Two Caesar was met by a Helvetian leader to explore conditions of a 
settlement. Caesar offered peace if the Helvetii submitted hostages, offered compensation 
for the damage they had done during their march, and returned to their country. The 
proud (or, in Caesar’s view, arrogant) Helvetian declined. Act Three consisted of a fierce 
battle, provoked by the Helvetii and finally won by the Romans (though with heavy losses), 
in which the greater part of the Helvetian migrants perished. In Act Four the survivors 
surrendered, exhausted after three days of flight with no supplies, and were sent back to their 
country.35 
Caesar reports that in the Helvetian camp tablets were found with the names of all 
the migrants. Their total, he says, was 368,000, out of whom 92,000 bore arms. 110,000 
returned home—around a third!36 That there were tablets can hardly be doubted—many 
witnesses must have seen them. Their explanation is debated. The numbers look artificial 
and are certainly vastly exaggerated. Modern scholars think of a total of perhaps 80,000 
migrants, 20,000 of whom were combatants.37 What draws attention more than numbers is 
Caesar’s way of proceeding. He found or created a cause for war, even if the enemy tried to 
avoid it, and then pursued victory with single-minded determination. Peace was possible, but 
only on Caesar’s terms!38 
This is the Caesar driven by fierce ambition and held back by few scruples. We 
will find this pattern in several cases of conquest atrocities discussed below. As Suetonius 
formulates it, “He lost no opportunity of picking quarrels—however flimsy the pretext—
with allies as well as hostile and barbarous tribes, and marching against them.”39
4. An Overview of Caesar’s Worst War Atrocities
The massacre of the Tigurini eliminated a substantial part of the Helvetian force.40 
Otherwise, Caesar fought the Helvetii to prevent their migration, not to annihilate them. 
To form a fuller assessment, we now need to survey his other war atrocities in more detail. 
33  1.2–11; “right next”: 1.10.2.
34  1.12.
35  1.12–28.
36  1.29. The number of survivors sent home should be augmented by those of the 32,000 Boii who had joined the 
Helvetii and were allowed to settle among the Aedui (1.28.5, 29.2).
37  92,000 is exactly one quarter of 368,000. Pennacini 1993: 984, at 1.29 n.2, lists numbers given by other ancient 
sources and some scholarship on this issue; see also the discussion in Walser 1998: 72–74; Pelling 2011: 222–24. 
Some scholars (whose arguments are summarized by Walser, and Walser himself in Walser 1998: 37–88, 150–81, 
182–90) have radically challenged the entire campaign report. Despite many important observations, they go too 
far in trying to demonstrate wholesale fiction and massive distortion on the part of Caesar: there were too many 
witnesses (see at n. 61 below).
38  See, however, below at n. 124.
39  Suetonius, Divus Julius 24.3.
40  See at n. 34 above. 
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With a view on genocide, I focus here on the most outrageous cases. Space limitations do not 
allow me to give a full survey of all episodes in which Caesar displayed cruelty in some form 
or other.41 Throughout we stay aware that we mostly depend on Caesar as our only source, 
that his characterization of his various enemies (peoples and leaders) is partisan and, with 
few exceptions, probably too negative, and that the narrative, though probably never grossly 
distorted, is tainted and bent throughout to serve Caesar’s interests.42
Episode 1: Still in 58, having defeated the Helvetians, Caesar was asked by 
Gallic leaders for help against the German warlord Ariovistus who had crossed the Rhine 
by invitation of Gallic nations but had turned against them and established a personal 
fiefdom in southeastern Gaul, tyrannizing the nations in his orbit. Caesar describes him 
as untrustworthy, deceitful, and arrogant, an obvious threat to Rome’s Gallic allies and 
the safety of the Transalpine province. After much diplomatic and military maneuvering, 
Ariovistus’ army was defeated. “Soon all the enemy turned in rout and did not stop running 
until they reached the Rhine River… There, a very small number… managed to save 
themselves… But our cavalry ran down all the others and killed them.”43 The total death toll 
supposedly was 80,000, including the German women and children.44
 Episode 2: The second year (57) began with a “conspiracy” of the Belgae, a large 
group of nations located in the north of Gaul. Alarmed by Caesar’s invasion and his army’s 
wintering in Gaul, they prepared to expel the intruder. According to Caesar’s allies, close to 
300,000 select troops had been pledged, a large part of whom were marching south.45 Caesar 
thus claimed to react to aggression. Fickle, lacking discipline, and neglecting elementary 
logistics, the Belgae were defeated in a brave attempt to ford a river and then massacred in 
their chaotic withdrawal: “with no danger to themselves, our forces killed as many of them as 
they could in the course of the day.”46 
Episode 3: Caesar then advanced rapidly and forced several Belgic nations to 
surrender without fighting, doing them no harm. The Nervii, fiercest of all, were defeated in 
a major battle, despite heroic resistance that brought Caesar’s men to the brink of disaster.47 
The Atuatuci, their allies who had missed the battle and retreated, had concentrated their 
people and possessions in a heavily fortified town. They initially resisted but, frightened by 
the unfamiliar Roman siege machinery, surrendered, agreeing to offer hostages and hand 
over their weapons. Caesar spared them and protected them from abuse by his soldiers. But 
they had hidden many weapons; at night they tried a massive sortie but failed. Now Caesar 
considered them traitors and oath-breakers. The town was sacked, the booty, including 
53,000 persons, sold to the traders.48
Episode 4: At the end of 57, one of Caesar’s legates (sub-commanders) had 
accepted the submission of nations living along the Atlantic and English Channel coast and, 
as usual, taken hostages. A few months later the Veneti and their allies detained Roman 
requisitioning officers, expecting to exchange them for the hostages. Caesar took their 
supposed violation of the sacred protection of envoys as a cause for war and, after their 
defeat, the justification for an exceptionally severe punishment of the Veneti. As a deterrent, 
“he executed all councilors and sold the rest of the people as slaves.”49 This justification is 
far-fetched—requisitioning officers are not ambassadors—and there are other reasons to 
question Caesar’s narrative. Strabo maintains that the “revolt” of the Veneti was primarily a 
41  Some examples will be discussed below at n. 75. On the way Caesar presents massacres, see Powell 1998.
42  On Caesar’s tendentiousness, see Collins 1972; Raaflaub 2017: web essays HH and JJ, available at www.
landmarkcaesar.com (accessed June 25, 2020). See also below at n. 61. 
43  1.53. The entire campaign: 1.30–53.
44  Plutarch, Caesar 19.12; Appian, Roman History 4 (Celtic Wars) 1.3. See further below at n. 160.
45  Number: 2.4.
46  2.11.6.
47  2.16–28.
48  2.33.6–7. The entire campaign: 2.29–33.
49  3.16.4. The entire campaign: 3.7–16. For an in-depth criticism of Caesar’s narrative, see Stevens 1952: 8–14, 
on which see Levick 1998.
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war motivated by their determination to prevent Caesar from possibly invading Britain and 
interrupting their profitable trade with the Britons.50 
Episode 5 concerns the annihilation of the Usipetes and Tencteri, described at the 
beginning of this paper and further discussed below.51 
Episode 6: In the fall of 54 Caesar stationed 15 cohorts (one and a half legions, 
more than 5,000 men) in a winter camp among the Eburones. Their leader, Ambiorix, 
repelled in a surprise attack on this camp, pretended that the Gauls had conceived of a 
common plan to attack all Roman camps on the same day so that no mutual support 
was possible. Still, because of Caesar’s favors, he promised the Romans safe conduct to 
the boundaries of his territory. After an intense debate in their war council the Romans 
evacuated their camp. Their force was ambushed and destroyed almost to the last man.52 
Caesar leaves no doubt about Sabinus’ grievous mistakes. But his anger and hatred 
turned against Ambiorix whom, we sense, he had considered his friend and whose betrayal 
he took very personally. In the summer of 53 he organized a systematic hunt for Ambiorix 
who narrowly escaped. The army burned the Eburones’ villages and buildings, destroyed 
the harvests, drove off the herds, and killed whomever they could find. Those who survived 
would die of starvation.53 In 51 Caesar returned. Since he no longer hoped to capture 
Ambiorix, he writes, “the next best thing Caesar could do for his honor and reputation was 
to devastate his territory to such a degree, destroying its inhabitants, buildings, and herds, 
that if chance left any of Ambiorix’ people alive,” they would never allow him to return to 
his nation.54 The goal of all these actions was “that the nation and its very name would be 
eradicated for the terrible crime they had committed.”55
Episode 7: In the winter of 53/52, the Carnutes, hosts of the central sanctuary of 
the Druids, launched a pan-Gallic war against Caesar (soon to be Vercingetorix’ war) by 
massacring the Roman traders who had settled in Cenabum, their main town.56 A year later, 
after the Gallic disaster at Alesia and upon complaints of the Carnutes’ neighbors, Caesar led 
two legions against them in the coldest winter. 
[The Carnutes] scattered in flight and abandoned their villages and towns ... 
[Caesar sent light troops and cavalry] everywhere the enemy were reported to have 
been heading ... The Carnutes were overwhelmed by the hardships of the winter 
and their dread of the dangers surrounding them; driven from their homes, they did 
not dare stay anywhere for long, and during the harshest weather of the year they 
could not find any shelter in the woods. Scattered as they were, they lost a large part 
of their population, and the rest were dispersed among the nearby nations.57 
5. Caesar the Brutal Conqueror
This is Caesar the brutal conqueror. Considering that for nine years he was the sole decision-
maker on monumental issues that affected life and death of his army and entire nations, 
all for the sake of his own (and Rome’s) honor, prestige, and power, we may find it less 
puzzling that, at the end of his Gallic command, both forced by his enemies and in “an act 
of monumental egotism,” he consciously and explicitly set his honor and political survival 
50  Strabo, Geography 4.4.1, barely hinted at in BG 3.8.1. The Veneti, like many other opponents of Rome, 
probably had no concrete understanding of the full Roman meaning of “surrender” (deditio) to which they had 
agreed (on which, see Livy 1.38.1–2; Polybius 20.9.10–11; Lintott 1993: 16–18).
51  At n. 163.
52  5.26–37. This episode stands out not least because in both the war council and the ensuing disastrous battle 
Caesar’s report emphasizes an exemplary contrast between good and bad leadership (represented by the junior 
commander Cotta and the senior commander Sabinus, respectively).
53  6.29.4–34.9; 6.43.
54  8.24.4–25.1.




above the well-being of his nation by plunging it into the misery of civil war.58 
Yet he wrote the Gallic War while he expected to return to Rome at the end of his 
command. Its purpose was to prepare the Roman Senate and public for his resumption of 
an honored career there. In all the cases discussed above he carefully explains his reasons 
and decisions. Most of these explanations focus on his obligation to defend Roman allies and 
Roman honor and ensure the safety of the Roman province and, as the war progressed, the 
stability of Roman control over Gaul. We may wonder why justification was so important 
to him, especially when, as we shall see, his methods of seeking and ensuring victory, 
including his atrocities, fit long-standing Roman practices to which the public was thoroughly 
accustomed. The answer probably is not that he felt guilty and sought to present excuses but 
that the war he fought in Gaul was exceptionally public. Normally, what governors and army 
commanders did in their wars reached notoriety only if it was particularly outrageous and 
raised an unusual level of criticism and protest that was conveyed to Rome and prompted a 
Senate investigation. Caesar, however, had achieved a high level of notoriety and provoked 
powerful opposition in Rome long before he assumed his Gallic command. His enemies 
watched his every step and were even in touch with Ariovistus who claimed, Caesar says, that 
“if he killed Caesar, he would be doing a favor to many noblemen and leaders of the Roman 
people—which he knew from these people themselves, through their own messengers.”59 
We know that communications between Caesar’s camps and people in Rome and 
Italy (senators, officials, families, friends) were intense and not controlled (or controllable) by 
Caesar.60 He acted virtually under the eyes of Rome. Incidentally, this is one of the strongest 
arguments supporting the essential veracity of his account. There were too many witnesses 
to allow him to get away with large-scale falsification. For the same reason, because he knew 
that his actions were constantly scrutinized, Caesar took great pains to avoid anything that 
could be misinterpreted as a breach of negotiations or a truce, and to justify his actions with 
arguments that would sound compelling to any Roman who was not his inveterate enemy.61
To be sure, since antiquity Caesar has been admired for his achievements. He was 
a superb general. In some fifty battles, fought in Gaul and all over the Roman empire, he 
was defeated only three times (twice on the same day). His military successes would not have 
been possible without his extraordinary qualities as a leader of men. He knew his soldiers, 
understood their needs, potential, and limits, and was able to combine strict discipline with a 
high level of tolerance. All this permitted him to expect and receive from them performance 
on the highest level, year after year.62 In addition, Caesar was a remarkable literary talent. 
Cicero appreciated him as a brilliant orator and, based on his De analogia, as an expert 
in language style and the purity of the Latin language.63 His published war reports (the 
Gallic War) received high praise for their unadorned elegance and precision of expression.64 
His achievements and qualities as a politician are debatable. His uncompromising anti-
conservative stance, lack of patience, quick anger, and readiness to do things alone if he ran 
into resistance made many enemies and prevented his lasting success. But he was one of very 
few senators in his time who were able to recognize the profound and urgent problems the 
Roman state was facing, and to propose solutions. Politically, he was in several ways  
a visionary.65
Against all this stands his record of atrocities committed in Gaul. For centuries 
58  BC 1.7–9; Suetonius, Divus Julius 30; Plutarch, Caesar 32.7–8; Eckstein 2004 (quote: 279); for a fuller 
treatment, see Raaflaub 1974: 1–225.
59  1.44.12.
60  Cicero’s correspondence with his brother Quintus, a legate in Caesar’s army, and many other items in Cicero’s 
letter corpus offer plenty of examples. See Shackleton Bailey 1972 and, overall, Osgood 2009.
61  See 1.46.3.
62  On Caesar as a general, see Goldsworthy 1998; Le Bohec 2001; Rosenstein 2009; Potter 2010; de Blois 2017.
63  Cicero, Brutus 252–61. De analogia: Garcea 2012.
64  Hirtius, BG 8 praef. 4–5; Cicero, Brutus 262. For discussions of all of Caesar’s works, see Grillo and Krebs 2018.
65  See the biographies cited in n.23; in addition, Raaflaub 2010. 
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these acts were ignored or minimized, perhaps because many of Caesar’s readers considered 
the brutality of war an unchangeable fact or took imperialism and its devastation of native 
populations for granted.66 Today we are more sensitive in considering these problems. As 
said earlier, some scholars even accuse him of genocide. 
6. “Genocide” and “War Crimes”
Before we accept this accusation we have to ask whether the label “genocide” is justified in 
this case. The term is modern, created by the historian Raphael Lemkin in reaction to Nazi 
crimes in German-occupied Europe, more specifically those we categorize as “holocaust 
crimes.”67 The term is also applied to the case of the Armenians earlier in the twentieth 
century, increasingly to that of native nations in America’s conquest of the west and Spain’s 
conquest of the New World and, more recently, to cases in Uganda, former Yugoslavia, 
Myanmar, and China.68 
The crime of genocide is defined by the UN Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted in 1948 and entered into force in 1951):
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intention to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.69 
The intention to destroy is thus crucial, while it matters less whether the intention was fully 
or partly realized. Importantly, of the four categories mentioned in the UN Convention, only 
“national group” fits Caesar’s case, in the sense that his opponents and victims were Gallic 
and German nations. Despite the prejudices invoked by the term “barbarian” and despite 
Caesar’s efforts to “otherize” Gauls and especially Germans through stereotypical negative 
character traits (the fickle Gauls, the arrogant, treacherous Germans), Caesar did not fight 
or annihilate Gauls or Germans because of their ethnic, racial, or religious difference from 
Romans.70 Recognizing the lack of precision in the extant texts and the difficulty of applying 
to ancient events a modern definition that is based on legal concepts, some scholars propose 
modifications, such as “genocidal massacre.”71 
The case of the Eburones (section 4 episode 6) certainly meets the UN criteria, 
and here Caesar himself expresses the intended annihilation: “that the nation and its very 
name would be eradicated for the terrible crime they had committed.”72 In the case of the 
Carnutes (episode 7) his choice of time (the coldest winter) and method of proceeding leave 
no doubt about his intention. Although different, the cases of Ariovistus (episode 1) and the 
Usipetes and Tencteri (described at the beginning) qualify as well. Caesar did not tolerate 
these Germans in Gaul. Since they refused his proposals and did not leave voluntarily, he 
destroyed them through military defeat and wholesale massacre.
66  See James 2013 for corresponding tendencies among archaeologists.
67  His texts are collected in Lemkin 2012. On genocide: Kiernan 2007, 2014; Bloxham and Moses 2010; Jones 
2011; Rubinstein 2014; Carmichael and Maguire 2015; Konstan 2021; Taylor 2021. Genocide in antiquity: van 
Wees 2010, 2016. More generally, on Roman atrocities: Westington 1938; on Caesar’s massacres: Powell 1998.
68  See relevant chapters in Bloxham and Moses 2010.
69  https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf (accessed  
May 27, 2020).
70  On Caesar and barbarians, see Burns 2003: 88–139; on Roman depictions of barbarians, Ferris 2000.
71  Quesada-Sanz 2015.
72  6.34.8.
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“Virtual killing” could be achieved by eliminating a group socially through 
collective enslavement: Orlando Patterson calls slavery “social death.”73 If we include this in 
the definition of “genocide,” the Atuatuci and Veneti, who broke their oaths of surrender, 
chose war, were defeated and sold collectively into slavery, are also victims of genocide.74 
Other cases do not fit the definition. The disastrous losses of the Helvetii, Belgae, 
and Nervii occurred in battles in two of which Caesar’s army suffered heavy casualties 
as well.75 The massacre of the population of Avaricum (modern Bourges), including the 
aged, women, and children, and of thousands of additional defenders was caused, Caesar 
claims, by the soldiers who ran amok because of exhaustion and anger and in revenge for 
their compatriots massacred by the Carnutes at Cenabum.76 Caesar had not ordered this—
whatever he thought (and we might think) about it. As the UN definition shows, genocidal 
intention is crucial, and such intention requires a superior design or order.77 Moreover, 
Caesar besieged Avaricum not to annihilate its population but to gain a major victory in an 
ongoing war, and Avaricum was only one of many towns of the Bituriges.78
Nor does the case of the defenders of Uxellodunum in 51 fit the definition. There, 
the townspeople, relying on their town’s impregnable location, had taken in a band of some 
2,000 Gauls whom Roman troops had deterred from raiding the Roman province. Caesar 
cut off the town’s water supply and forced it to surrender. Believing that, in order to be able 
to fully pacify the country, he needed to set a severe example to discourage imitators, he 
had the hands of all arms-bearing men cut off but allowed them to live.79 The intention was 
punishment, not extinction.
The case of the Mandubii in late 52 is again different. Alesia, their town, was 
occupied by Vercingetorix and his army and besieged by Caesar. Running out of supplies, 
the defenders ejected all those who were useless as fighters, including the families of the 
Mandubii. Caesar refused to let them pass through his fortification and feed them. He 
was trying to starve Vercingetorix into submission and was unwilling to relieve his supply 
problems by allowing part of the population to escape. The Mandubii supposedly perished 
in the no man’s land between the town and Caesar’s fortifications.80 As so often in history, 
innocent people here became the victims of a brutal war.
Still, in all these episodes Caesar’s willingness to tolerate or encourage brutality 
is abundantly clear. And, as we saw, without the slightest doubt Caesar can rightfully be 
accused of multiple cases of genocide. Needless to say, his actions in Gaul also violated 
much that is barred in modern conventions limiting abuses in warfare (the so-called Geneva 
Conventions adopted in 1929 and 1949), and represent “war crimes” as they are defined in 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in The Hague in 2002:  
(i)  Willful killing; 
(ii)  Torture or inhuman treatment…;  
(iii)  Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; 
(iv)  Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
 military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; … 
(vii)  Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; 
(viii)  Taking of hostages.81 
73  Patterson 1982. For further discussion, see Bodel and Scheidel 2017.
74  Atuatuci: 2.30–33; Veneti: 3.7–16. Collective enslavement as genocide: van Wees 2016: 20.
75  Helvetii: 1.26.5, 29.3. Belgae: section 4 episode 2. Nervii: 2.28.1–2.
76  7.28.4–5. Supposedly, only 800 of 40,000 survived. Cenabum: above at n. 56.
77  See van Wees 2010: 243.
78  7.15.1–2.
79  8.30–44.
80  7.78; Dio Cassius 40.40.2–4.
81  https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf (accessed May 28, 2020).
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All this is undeniable. It is very important to fully realize it. We have every right 
to condemn Caesar for his appalling record of brutality in Gaul, even if, as we shall see, it 
is perhaps too simple to label him “a very bad man.”82 Seeing in 2020 statues defaced and 
falling that are tied to an abominable past of slavery and a civil war unleashed to preserve 
it, we might find it just that in a Belgian town a statue of Caesar suffered the same fate.83 A 
call, presumably tongue-in-cheek, to rename the months July and August that, the author 
emphasizes, honor two of the most murderous despots in world history, appeared in July 
2020 in a letter to a newspaper.84 
Yet we should also be aware that such modern judgements are based on ideas and 
agreements that emerged in history only after two millennia of further brutal warfare and 
some especially outrageous abuses.85 After all, it took the horrendous suffering witnessed 
by Henry Dunant in 1859 in the aftermath of the battle of Solferino in northern Italy, 
one of the largest battles in history, to stimulate the foundation of the International Red 
Cross, and the mass-murdering world wars to create the League of Nations and the United 
Nations.86 Nothing like this existed in the ancient world, even if in fourth-century bce 
Greece various (ultimately unsuccessful) attempts were made to secure peace through large-
scale international “common peace” agreements.87 Greeks and Romans were also aware 
of “norms or laws of war” that were concerned with basic issues (such as the protection of 
heralds and ambassadors or the need to fight just wars) but, as Adriaan Lanni emphasizes, 
“did not encompass humanitarian ideals” and “were indifferent to considerations of mercy 
and the protection of noncombatants.”88 Nor did they try to prevent the mass killing of 
defeated enemies which was in fact quite common.89 And they did not apply to wars against 
“barbarians.”
7. Why Not Simply Eliminate Caesar from the Latin Curriculum?
The unsettling aspects of Caesar’s warmaking raise the stark problems that I sketched early in 
this paper and every reader of his works must confront. In particular, in the USA, together 
with Vergil, Caesar provides the Advanced Placement (AP) curriculum of high school Latin. 
For teachers the question of how to deal with this bloodthirsty author must be a challenge. 
Students on all levels, who, I hope, today are more critical of the material that is presented 
to them than they were in my own student years, will and should ask penetrating questions. 
And we, their teachers, should be able to answer them. 
Of course, a simple solution that seems to be mentioned not infrequently would be 
to eliminate Caesar from the Latin curriculum. I fully understand those who advocate this 
solution. Right now, of course, high school teachers have no choice, but this must not keep us 
from thinking both about alternatives and about why it might still be worth reading Caesar. I 
82  Thus Kulikowski 2020, reviewing O’Donnell 2019 who writes about the Gallic War: Undeniably, “this is 
a great work of literature, one of the greatest, and at the same time, … it is a bad man's book about his own bad 
deeds. I think it is the best bad man's book ever written” (viii). See further sections 8–9 below.
83  I thank Elizabeth Baer and Jennifer Yates for alerting me to this case: https://www.lavenir.net/cnt/
dmf20200614_01483015/une-statue-de-jules-cesar-vandalisee-a-zottegem?fbclid=IwAR2j4vAxblVNU29726Ci7kB
nKESE7JZSdpXJb1ijaJsVrEj4mDdGg-b9-So (accessed July 20, 2020).
84  https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/mailbag/letter-if-you-want-to-be-politically-correct-rename-calendar/
article_f6206dc5-6385-58ec-b31e-76fdd2b4ce39.html?utm_medium=social&utm_source=email&utm_
campaign=user-share (accessed July 26, 2020). I thank Francis Oates for this information.
85  Kiernan 1999 examines the suitability of the concept of genocide for pre-modern events.
86  See, e.g., Boissier 1985; Northedge 1986; Peters 2015, respectively.
87  Common peace (koinē eirēnē): Ryder 1965; Jehne 1994; chapters by J. Wilker and P. Low in Wilker 2012: 
92–117, 118–34.
88  Lanni 2008: 470; see also Ober 1996; Bederman 2001: 242–63. On just war and the role of the priesthood 
of the fetiales in Rome, see Wiedemann 1986; Rich 2011. Rüpke 1990: 97–124, followed by Ando 2011, argues 
vigorously for a late republican invention of the fetial ritual and law and its subsequent retrojection into early 
Roman history. 
89  See van Wees 2011.
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am concerned here with the latter and suggest that, by ignoring Caesar and thus choosing an 
“easy” way out, we miss an opportunity and avoid an important challenge. 
  For Caesar’s Gallic War is about much more than war and atrocities. Apart 
from the ethnographies that figure prominently in the AP selections, this work presents 
to us elements of a cultural portrait of Rome at the end of the Republic: it shows us an 
eminent Roman’s concept of what a general and statesman should be and what a Roman 
citizen ideally was, what his qualities were, and how he behaved—in sharp contrast to what 
“barbarians” (and, in the Civil War, Romans acting like barbarians) were.90 Anticipating 
Anchises’ famous words in Aeneid 6 (quoted below), Caesar also lets us perceive his view  
of Rome’s cultural mission in the world: to conquer a chaotic and threatening barbarian 
world, to impose civilization (mores) on the defeated, and thus to create a well-ordered, 
peaceful world.91 
These aspects may primarily be of historical interest, but they are significant in 
offering an inside perspective on the society that produced masterworks in literature (of all 
genres) and art (which influenced cultural achievements into our own time) and an empire 
that eventually provided the foundations for hugely consequential developments in religion, 
law, and other areas of civilization. In addition, these aspects invite critical analysis. I give 
but one example. One of the most fascinating ways in which the “program” of Rome’s 
cultural mission is highlighted in the Gallic War is the Gauls’ fight to preserve their ancestral 
liberty. Rather than suppressing this noble motive, Caesar lets Gallic leaders emphasize it 
frequently, culminating in the pan-Gallic war against Caesar in 52. At Alesia Critognatus, a 
respected leader but notorious for proposing cannibalism to ward off starvation, argues: 
What do [the Romans] want, except to settle in the fields and cities of the Gauls 
and bind the people in slavery forever? … They have never waged war for any 
other reasons than these … Look at our neighbor ‘Gaul’ which has been reduced 
to a province, had its rights and laws transformed, been made subject to their 
government, and is oppressed by perpetual slavery.92 
Vercingetorix, offering after his defeat to be extradited to Caesar, insists that he has 
undertaken this war only “to serve the cause of the common freedom.”93 
Since freedom was a Roman value too, this aspect of Caesar’s narrative might well 
have raised sympathy for the Gauls.94 Caesar surely was aware of this, and he does not miss 
opportunities to undercut such proclamations.95 His main point, however, seems to be that 
the Gauls’ subjection for the sake of realizing a safe, peaceful, and orderly world required the 
suppression of their ancestral liberty: here a great value needed to be sacrificed for the sake of 
an even higher one.96 Again we think of Anchises’ words in the Aeneid:
You, Roman, remember to rule the people with your command (imperium)—
these will be your skills—to impose civilization (morem) on peace,
to spare the subjected and to fight down the arrogant.97
This resonates with us as we contemplate tensions between ideology and reality: in particular, 
we might think of the contradictions between our own country’s longstanding advocacy 
90  See Raaflaub 2018: 22–27. Romans acting like barbarians: Raaflaub 1974: 293–307. Ethnographies:  
Shadee 2017.
91  See at n. 96 below.
92  7.77.14–16. “Our neighbor ‘Gaul’” refers to the Transalpine province.
93  7.89.1–2; see also, e.g., 5.7.8; 5.27.6; 7.1.5, and Hirtius in 8.1.3; Seager 2003: 22–26.
94  On Roman concepts of freedom, see Wirszubski 1950; Bleicken 1972.
95  Barlow 1998. Critognatus’ “barbaric” proposal of cannibalism (7.77.12–13) offers an example.
96  Raaflaub 2018: 22–23.
97  Vergil, Aeneid 6.851–53 (my trans.). See also Cicero’s arguments in On the Consular Provinces (at n. 28 above).
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of liberty, democracy, and human rights abroad and some imperial aspects of its foreign 
policies as well as the troubled history of failures to realize these ideals in attitudes and 
politics at home.
Caesar’s text thus challenges us to think about ourselves while reading his text. The 
categorization of the enemy or “other” as “barbarians” involves a plethora of prejudices and 
notions of superiority vs. inferiority that, however they are expressed, we can trace in recent 
history and the present as well, of the world and our own country.98 A thorough reading of 
Caesar’s text in its context allows us to recognize and dissect the techniques of subtle (and 
sometimes not so subtle) propaganda and to become alert to its use in our media. 
The same is true for Caesar’s war atrocities. Again without condoning them, we 
should be aware that, in committing them, he was but a link in a long chain that stretched 
from the ancient Near East to Greece and Rome, and far beyond.99 In fact, it reaches well 
into our own time. War is always brutal. Despite modern conventions and the efforts of 
world organizations, it still does not spare the innocent or refrain from wholesale massacres, 
even if their scale may stay below those reported by Caesar. So, rather than cutting Caesar 
from the Latin curriculum, we might use Caesar’s text to help our students learn from 
negative examples, as they may already be used to doing in other cases, and raise their critical 
awareness of the immorality and inhumanity of war and of the fundamental injustice of 
extolling military might and its facile use as a political tool—as world leaders, including our 
own, have been prone to do. History cannot be a magistra vitae (life’s teacher) if we look 
only at its edifying aspects but fail to confront its ugly faces.100
Finally, to invoke only one analogy, if we banish Caesar from our curricula should 
we not also desist from reading the Iliad with our students because the thoughts and actions 
of both sides in that epic war focus on annihilating the other?101 Would it not be better to 
help our students enhance their critical thinking through insights gained from discussing this 
seminal and deeply humane work not least, but emphatically, against the inhumane aspects 
of its content?
8. Understanding Caesar’s Atrocities by Contextualizing Them
When dealing with Caesar’s war atrocities we need to gain a fuller understanding by placing 
them in their broad historical and cultural context. In doing so, I emphasize again that 
understanding does not mean condoning or justifying. We may disapprove of an ancient 
leader’s actions, even most vigorously, while still trying to explain them from the perspective 
of their time and culture. 
To begin with, the German holocaust policy was based on an ideology that was 
independent of war, although its realization was greatly facilitated by war. The Armenian 
genocide too had a long prehistory of persecution and oppression; it was not centrally linked 
to war, but exacerbated and facilitated by it.102 Unlike these and some other cases of modern 
genocide but comparable to those committed during Spain’s conquests in the New World, 
all of Caesar’s “genocidal actions” took place in the context of war.103 Of course, this does 
not mean that war justifies genocide, but this context is relevant. Ancient wars, especially 
against foreign peoples, knew few moral constraints, and these concerned diplomacy rather 
than fighting and killing. Cato based his proposal to extradite Caesar to his victims not (or 
much less) on the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri as such than on the belief that he 
committed it and held envoys captive during a truce.104 Moreover, Caesar claims to have 
98  See above at n. 70.
99  See below at n. 117.
100  Historia magistra vitae: Cicero, De oratore 2.9.36.
101  See below at n. 118.
102  See, e.g., Longerich 2010; Hovannisian 1992, respectively.
103  Genocide in Spain’s New World conquests: Kiernan 2007: 72–100.
104  See above at n. 7; esp. Plutarch, Cato minor 51.1–5, discussed by Powell 1998: 124–28, and Pelling 2011: 251 
on Plutarch, Caesar 22.2–3.
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reacted with extreme violence only when forced by enemy aggression, treason, the violation 
of oaths, or extreme challenges to his honor code. All his genocidal actions fit this pattern. 
Those of Ariovistus, the Atuatuci, Veneti, Eburones, and Carnutes are obvious.105 For 
example, it was not the initial resistance of the Atuatuci but their violation of the conditions 
and oath of surrender that in Caesar’s view deprived them of any further claim to mercy and 
justified their “virtual annihilation” by collective enslavement.106
Only the case of the Usipetes and Tencteri (discussed in section 1) offers cause 
to hesitate. Caesar is adamant that here too the other side was guilty, not least of an 
unprovoked attack during a truce. Moreover, he had offered the two nations a way out of 
the confrontation that would have strengthened them in their defense against the Suebi. Still, 
Caesar’s justification seems more specious, his presentation of some of the events evasive, and 
his prejudicial intention to destroy the enemy difficult to overlook.107 
Another aspect to consider is that Caesar was a typical Roman and lived in a 
society whose values and sensitivities differed greatly from those in our own time—even 
if, given the current deep and pervasive polarizations in many countries and especially in 
our own, it seems difficult to make general statements about values that are typical of our 
society and time. At any rate, the events that gave rise to the new term “genocide” and to the 
conventions discussed above (section 6) happened only in the mid-nineteenth and twentieth 
century.108 Recent political and military actions, including some of our own country, reflect 
regrettably little respect for the ethical principles we might believe in. Undoubtedly and 
fortunately, modern sensitivities are more highly developed than ever, but if war crimes in 
Vietnam and Iraq have come under intense scrutiny it is probably the presence of journalists 
and social media in the war zones as much as moral revulsion in the military and among 
politicians that made investigations unavoidable. By contrast, although news from Gaul 
reached Rome by other channels as well, it was Caesar himself who reported the events to the 
Senate and large audiences in Rome and Italy in all their gruesome details.109 
The attitude of most senators toward such matters is illustrated well by Cicero who 
in 56 invoked the impact of Pompey’s victories in the east as a model for Caesar’s intentions 
in Gaul: “There is no people that has not been weakened to such an extent that it hardly 
exists anymore, or tamed so much that it holds its peace, or pacified so completely that it is 
happy about our victory and rule.”110 We should note also that at the end of 55, the year 
that featured the crossing into German territory and Britain but also the extinction of the 
two German nations, the Senate decreed a record number of thanksgiving days in honor of 
Caesar’s achievement.111 As multiple literary texts and inscriptions from the Republic and 
early Empire show, “the Romans thought that conquest was a good and glorious thing.” 
They “had a penchant for collecting and publicizing lists of the names of peoples or places” 
they had subjected or destroyed. Caesar’s long lists of nations arrayed against him and 
eventually defeated emphasize the same point. His actions and justifications were perfectly 
attuned to Roman ideology.112 
Moreover, Caesar operated in a country that was mostly unknown and hostile. He 
was often confronted by superior forces. Under these circumstances, I suspect, generals far 
beyond antiquity would have considered it vital to include in their arsenal distrust, preventive 
brutality, and exemplary punishment as a deterrent.113 Caesar knew how to use both the 
carrot and the stick.
105  Section 4 above, episodes 1, 3, 4, 6, 7.
106  2.32–33.
107  See n. 7 and n. 163 below.
108  See at n. 85 above.
109  See at n. 60 above for correspondence; on Caesar’s readers and audience, see Wiseman 1998.
110  On the Consular Provinces 12.31 (my trans.). On Cicero’s attitude toward imperialism, see Stevenson 2013: 
183–87.
111  4.38.5.
112  E.g., 2.4.4–10; 7.75.2–5. See Mattern 1999: 162–94 (quote: 164).
113  So too Powell 1998: 136 n.51.
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Arthur Eckstein describes the Mediterranean world of the last centuries bce as an 
anarchic jungle where might was right and the strongest prevailed. Rome had risen to rule 
in the Mediterranean through constant warfare. War had molded Roman society, social 
relations, and values. Uncounted numbers of victims of Roman conquests had been killed 
(in battles and massacres) or enslaved; in Italy these slaves served as an indispensable motor 
for the economy from which especially the elite profited enormously. Carthage and Corinth 
stand as examples of large, thriving cities that the Romans brutally destroyed in war.114 
The following example is extreme but not untypical. The Senate had granted the 
army of Aemilius Paullus, the victor over the Macedonian king Perseus at Pydna in 168 bce, 
the booty from the cities of Epirus that had supported the king. In a carefully coordinated 
surprise action, based on deception, 70 towns were sacked. Out of the enormous booty every 
soldier and cavalryman received a reward amounting to almost double their annual pay. 
150,000 persons were enslaved.115 Against this background, Caesar’s actions do not seem so 
unusual. In fact, without having the space to demonstrate this here, I feel confident in stating 
that not one of Caesar’s war atrocities does not have antecedents in the history of Roman 
imperialism before his time.116
Moreover, texts and images from the ancient Near East, the Hebrew Bible, and  
the Greek world illustrate the same pattern. The biblical “ban law” ordered the Hebrews  
to destroy completely (persons, animals, and property) some of the enemies they 
conquered.117 In the Iliad, Menelaus is about to take a Trojan captive for ransom, when 
Agamemnon intervenes: 
Not one of them
Escapes sheer death at our hands, not even
The boy who is still in his mother’s womb.
Every Trojan dies, unmourned and unmarked.118
Indeed, the complete extermination of Troy by killing the men, enslaving the women and 
children, and destroying the town is the goal of the Achaean heroes and, conversely, the 
complete destruction of the Achaean army and fleet that of the Trojans in this seminal work 
that is widely admired as foundational for European literature, with a cultural impact that 
reaches into our own time.119 In the unquestioned understanding of Greeks and Romans, the 
victors had the right to deal with the defeated and their property as they wished.120  
9. The Other Side of the Coin: Caesar the Clement Victor
There is yet another answer to the question I posed—one I consider particularly important 
because it sets a positive image against the negative one. This requires us, however, to be able 
to look, so-to-speak, at two sides of the same coin simultaneously and to acknowledge that 
history is never entirely one-dimensional: historical personalities no less than modern ones are 
complex, neither all good nor all bad, even if some verge close to one or the other extreme. 
Caesar was not only a typical but also a very untypical Roman. What made him exceptional 
among his fellow Roman conquerors, though, is not so much that he offered an enemy the 
114  Eckstein 2008. War and Roman Society: Harris 1979: chs. 1–2; Raaflaub 1996. War captives: Harris 1979: 
80–85. Carthage: e.g., Appian, Roman History 8 (Punic Wars) 74–136; Goldsworthy 2000.  Corinth: Pausanias, 
Description of Greece 7.16.7–10; Dio Cassius 21 (Zonaras 9.31).
115  Livy 45.33-34; on Pydna and its aftermath, see Lendon 2005: 193–211. 
116  See Westington 1938. No recent study is known to me.
117  As an example from the Ancient Near East, see Ussishkin 1982 (reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib at 
Nineveh, depicting the siege of Lachish during the king’s campaign against Judah in 701 bce; also accessible at 
google.com under “Lachish reliefs”). On the ban law in the Hebrew Bible see Niditch 1993: chs.1–2; Greenberg 
2007. Overall, see van Wees 2010, 2011, 2016.
118  Iliad 6.57–60; cf. 22.62–68 (trans. S. Lombardo).
119  On the “ideal of annihilation” in the Iliad, see van Wees 1992: 183–90; also Gottschall 2008.
120  E.g., Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.5.73.
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opportunity to avoid war and calamity or that he sometimes treated defeated enemies with 
moderation. Others had done this too. Scipio Africanus the Elder (the victor over Hannibal) 
and the Younger (the brutal destroyer of Carthage), Pompey, and others were credited with 
having applied moderation in memorable cases or to memorable effect.121 Livy (of course 
writing after Caesar) even lets the Carthaginians enhance their peace appeal to Rome by 
emphasizing that it had enlarged its empire almost more by sparing the defeated than by the 
victories themselves.122
The crucial difference is that these earlier generals had used clemency occasionally. 
Caesar elevated it to a principle or preferred modus operandi—although, if informative 
sources had survived to let us know more about his predecessors, Caesar might appear 
somewhat less exceptional than he does now. Several extant sources, however, recognize the 
singular merit of Caesar’s focus on clemency. Cicero’s use of clemency in connection with 
Caesar increases in his correspondence after the spring of 49 and in his “Caesarian” speeches 
of 46–45. Pliny the Elder criticizes Caesar for his bloody victories and for boasting about the 
numbers of enemies killed, and overall rates Pompey’s achievement higher, but he praises 
Caesar’s “peculiar distinction of the clemency in which (even to the point of subsequent 
regret) he surpassed all men; also he afforded an example of magnanimity that no other can 
parallel.”123  
Yes, peace was possible only if Caesar offered it and on Caesar’s terms and, yes, his 
interference in Gaul was, despite all his justifications, motivated by only one cause, and that 
was Rome’s imperialist drive, compounded by Caesar’s ambition and need for victories.124 
But all this corresponded to the harsh reality of war and imperialism throughout the ancient 
world and far beyond. Roman triumphs were awarded for great victories, based on numbers 
(enemies killed and towns destroyed). In the dedicatory inscription on the shrine of Minerva 
that Pompey built with the spoils of his eastern wars, he boasted of having in those wars 
“routed, scattered, slain, or received the surrender of 12,183,000 people, sunk or taken 846 
ships, [and] received the capitulation of 1,538 towns and forts.”125 The “objective” criterion 
of 5,000 enemies killed, long considered decisive but now debated, cannot be totally off 
the mark.126 Mary Beard begins her exploration of the Roman triumph with a quote from 
Seneca that offers an analogy: “Petty sacrilege is punished; sacrilege on a grand scale is the 
stuff of triumphs.”127 Caesar’s care in informing his readers of the masses of enemies defeated 
and killed, both throughout his war narrative and in his triumphal display in 46, shows that 
he was much aware of the significance of statistics of names and numbers.128 
Hence it is all the more remarkable that in his quest for victory and conquest Caesar 
sought the destruction of his opponents only in specific and, in his view, clearly justifiable 
cases, when the nature of the enemy’s actions left him no choice. Clemency, one might say, 
was Caesar’s default action. He speaks remarkably often of it, even as his habit and character 
trait. Already in 57 he lets the Atuatuci appeal to his clemency as a widely known fact: “if 
Caesar, in his merciful kindness (clementia et mansuetudo), about which they had heard 
from others, decided to spare them.” In his response, Caesar describes his decision to do so as 
121  Scipio the Elder: Polybius 15.17.3–7; Livy 33.12.7. Scipio the Younger: Polybius 10.17.6–16; Pompey: Cicero, 
Verrine 2.5.153; Plutarch, Pompey 20.8. 
122  Livy 30.42.17; cf. Vergil, Aeneid 6.853 (at n. 97 above). On clemency in Roman foreign policy before Caesar, 
see Weinstock 1971: 234–37.
123  Pliny, Natural History 7.92–93 (trans H. Rackham); cf. Suetonius, Divus Julius 75. 
124  As explained in section 3 above. For Caesar’s role in the history of Roman imperialism, see Stevenson 2013: 
187–92. For the language of imperialism, Lavan 2013.
125  Pliny, Natural History 7.97; cf. Plutarch, Pompey 45.2–4.
126  Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds and Sayings 2.8.1; for discussion, Beard 2007: 209–11.
127  Seneca, Letter 87.23; Beard 2007: 1. See Beard 199–214 on the criteria for a triumph.
128  Triumph: Pliny, Natural History 7.92 (above at n. 13). Size of enemy armies and numbers of enemies killed: 
e.g., 1.29.2; 2.4.5–10; 2.28.2; 4.15.3; 7.75; also 8.29.4. See, on this kind of statistics, Wiseman 1985: 1-10; Williams 
2001: 38–40; Pelling 2011: 211.
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his habit (consuetudo).129 In 51 at Uxellodunum, Hirtius writes, Caesar “was aware that his 
merciful disposition (lenitas) was known to everyone, and he did not need to be afraid that, 
if he acted more harshly than usual, it would be ascribed to his cruel character (crudelitas 
naturae).”130 The vocabulary Caesar uses for this attitude is varied: clementia twice in 
Book 2, otherwise “mildness” (lenitas, mansuetudo), “commiseration” (misericordia), even 
humanitas, and several other terms.131 Whatever the words, this attitude was expressed in 
deeds. Two examples must suffice here.
After their capitulation in 58, he sent the Helvetii back to their country and ordered 
them to rebuild their towns. Because they had no supplies left to survive the winter, he 
instructed the nearest nation in his province to assist them. After the surrender of the Nervii 
who had suffered horrendous losses in the battle at the Sambre in 57, “Caesar wished to 
make it known that he was merciful in dealing with miserable people and suppliants. He 
thus took great care for their safety,” ordering their neighbors to refrain from exploiting their 
weakness.132 
 Of course, in all these cases Caesar’s clemency was also driven by ulterior motives. 
Resettlement of the Helvetii in their own country would prevent German invaders from 
taking it over.133 To help the Nervii recover from their disastrous defeat might entice others 
to avoid risking a war and battle, while the punishment of the Atuatuci and the men of 
Uxellodunum clearly was meant to deter imitation by others. And, of course, clemency, 
however termed, is to be understood within its Roman parameters. In war, it inevitably 
implied a massive power difference between giver and recipient. Although the definition 
Seneca offers in On Clemency is far too restrictive to be applied universally in the mid-
first century bce, for the conditions under which Caesar operated the essentials are valid: 
whenever a person who has power over another person, group, or nation to punish, take 
vengeance, oppress, or kill does not use this power, he demonstrates clemency.134 Hence, 
in Roman perception, Caesar’s decision to accept the Atuatuci’s first capitulation without 
doing them any harm—after they had demonstrated their support for the Nervii and actively 
resisted his siege operations at their town—counted as clemency.135 To use modern parallels, 
the allied victors’ treatment of Germany in the Versailles Treaty of 1919 was the opposite, 
the American help to rebuild Germany after World War II a shining example of Roman-
style clemency—whatever the ulterior motives behind these policies.136
Caesar’s principle of applying clemency whenever possible was even more visible 
during the civil war against Pompey. Many feared that both leaders would imitate the cruelty 
Sulla had exhibited in the civil war of the 80s. Of Caesar Cicero wrote: “You may well 
be afraid of a massacre, although nothing would be less in Caesar’s interest if he wants his 
victory and personal power to last.”137 But Caesar surprised everybody and turned public 
opinion in his favor, when, at the first opportunity he had, he dismissed unharmed all senators 
and equestrians who had been fighting against him.138 Cicero commented: “The truth is that 
any evil this Pisistratus has not done is earning him as much popularity as if he were to have 
stopped someone else doing it … They are delighted with his deceitful clemency (insidiosa 
clementia) and fear the other’s wrath.”139 Caesar himself wrote to two of his supporters: 
129  2.31.4, 32.1.
130  8.44.1 (see above at n. 79).
131  Clementia: 2.14.5; 2.31.4. Variety of terms typical of this period: Konstan 2005: 341–42.
132  Helvetii: 1.28.3; Nervii: 2.28.3.
133  1.28.4.
134  See Seneca, De clementia 2.3.1. For discussion, see Konstan 2005.
135  On Caesar’s clemency, see, e.g., Dahlmann 1967; Weinstock 1971: 233–43; Alföldi 1985: ch.5; Campi 1997, 
and especially Konstan 2005.
136  See, e.g., Boemeker et al. 1998; Sharp 2011, and Hogan 1987; Schain 2001, respectively.
137  Cicero, Letters to Atticus 7.22.1. Trans. here and below Shackleton Bailey 1978a, modified.
138  BC 1.22–23; other spectacular acts of clemency: 1.72; 3.98.
139  Cicero, Letters to Atticus 8.16.2. “This Pisistratus” refers to the famous Athenian tyrant and characterizes 
Caesar as a tyrant; “the other” is Pompey.
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I had already decided on a policy to demonstrate as much leniency as possible … 
Let’s try whether in this way we can regain the goodwill of all people and achieve 
lasting victory, because others have not been able by cruelty to escape hatred and 
to hold on to victory for any length of time—except only for Sulla whom I am not 
going to imitate. Let this be our new way of conquering: to protect ourselves by 
mercy and generosity (misericordia et liberalitate).140 
To Cicero he wrote: “You rightly surmise of me… that of all things I abhor cruelty… I am 
not disturbed by the fact that those whom I have released are said to have left the country 
in order to make war against me once more. Nothing pleases me better than that I should be 
true to my nature and they to theirs.”141 By 46, Cicero’s initial skepticism had subsided: he 
too now spoke of Caesar’s “mild and merciful disposition” (mitis clemensque natura).142
Caesar was well aware that the civil war, in which he was fighting against Roman 
citizens, created conditions that differed massively from those of his Gallic campaigns.143 
Hence his frequent application of clemency in the Gallic wars, as his default action, as a 
principle, and as his character trait, seem all the more remarkable. His attitude is consistent 
throughout his wars.
Augustus followed his adoptive father—although only after the brutal phase 
of his life in the civil wars and proscriptions was over. In his Res Gestae (Record of His 
Achievements) he wrote: “As victor I spared the lives of all citizens who asked for mercy.”144 
The Senate honored him for this in 27 by the gift of the clipeus virtutis, a golden shield with 
the inscription “the shield of virtue, clemency, justice, and piety toward the gods and the 
fatherland”—the first formulation of the four cardinal virtues.145 Henceforth, clementia was 
firmly established among the canonical virtues of the emperors.146 
Caesar has a good claim to have integrated clementia among the cardinal virtues, 
and probably of having consolidated these virtues in their soon-to-be canonical set.147 This, 
then, would be the imaginary coin I mentioned at the beginning of this section. On the 
obverse it would display the head of Clementia or, as on a posthumous issue, the temple 
of Clementia Caesaris (Caesar’s Clemency) vowed by the Senate but never built because 
of the honoree’s assassination.148 The reverse would feature the brutal conqueror, with a 
captive Gallic warrior and a mourning woman representing Gaul below a trophy (a victory 
monument).149 Both images are linked: they represent two aspects of Caesar’s complex  
war record.
10. Conclusion
In ancient Greek sources genocide was regarded as an ultimate punishment that could be 
legitimately inflicted when a community had committed a serious collective offense that 
called for such measures. In antiquity, Hans van Wees suggests, this view was most widely 
accepted during periods when states tried to preserve their long-established hegemony or 
expanded rapidly. Once they had established their control, very few further acts of genocide 
are attested. Yet, van Wees continues, genocide was always also, and sometimes mainly, 
“an act of ‘conspicuous destruction’ that served to display the power of the perpetrators 
140  Ibid. 9.7C.1.
141  Ibid. 9.16.2.
142  Cicero, Letters to Friends 6.6.8. Trans. Shackleton Bailey 1978b.
143  See BC 1.72; Suetonius, Divus Julius 75. For a brief summary of Caesar’s political strategy in the civil war 
(explored fully in Raaflaub 1974), see Raaflaub 2003: 59–61.
144  Augustus, Res gestae 3.1. For the text with explanations, see Brunt and Moore 1967; Cooley 2009.
145  Augustus, Res gestae 34. On these virtues, see Weinstock 1971: 228–59; Galinsky 1996: 80–90.
146  See, e.g., Fears 1981; Classen 1991.
147  Weinstock 1971: 228–30, 237–41.
148  Cassius Dio 44.6.4; Weinstock 1971: 241–43; see, e.g., https://100falcons.wordpress.com/2009/04/20/
caesars-clemency/(accessed July 12, 2020).  
149  Coin: https://feminaeromanae.org/caesarcoins.html (accessed July 14, 2020).
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and to restore or enhance their ‘honor’.” Power and prestige were intimately linked. “Those 
who aimed for the highest possible status in the world order were least able to tolerate 
any challenge to their honor.”150 Those who know Thucydides will think of the “Melian 
Dialogue,” the mega-power Athens’ confrontation with the tiny island of Melos that ended 
with the Melians’ annihilation.151
 All this applies to Caesar too, whose name in the Gallic War always stands for the 
Roman people, the Roman state, and Roman honor. His “genocidal actions” in Gaul are 
typical of his expanding state and his society to which honor and prestige (dignitas that 
determined status and was primarily acquired in war) were among the highest values.152 
Given this background, Caesar’s ability both to embrace and transcend this generally 
accepted pattern seems remarkable. He was at the same time a brutal conqueror and a 
lenient victor. His ability to make clemency one of his guiding principles and propagate it as 
such, even claim it as his character trait, has few, if any, parallels before his time. 
 When I talk of Caesar’s clemency I often encounter the objection that all this was 
nothing but propaganda. Undoubtedly, Caesar’s writings served his positive self-presentation 
and propaganda, and clemency had high propaganda value. But was what Caesar did only 
propaganda? Effective propaganda builds on a solid foundation of fact. What must be 
decisive is that Caesar’s words and actions fit together. He propagated his clemency but he 
also practiced it to an unprecedented extent.153
The historian needs to understand and explain history, to judge it without prejudice. 
Caesar’s clemency offers us, in a brutal world of warfare and abuses, a positive example 
that we can use to get our students to think about the complexity of history and historical 
personalities and the difficulty of reconciling contradictory aspects of their lives and actions. 
We can both be disgusted with Caesar’s brutality and impressed by his clemency. We can 
acknowledge this tension and use it to convey valuable life lessons. 
Appendix: Caesar vs. Migrants
Two of Caesar’s war atrocities concern German invaders (Ariovistus and the Usipetes and 
Tencteri). His first victory in Gaul decimated another migrating nation (the Helvetii). They 
all were on the move to find a better place to live. Inevitably, we are reminded of experiences 
in our own time, in both Europe and the US, with large-scale migrations of refugees and 
seekers of asylum and a better life. But the analogy is superficial and misleading. 
In Caesar’s time the Rhine was not a firm demarcation line between Gauls and 
Germans. As Maureen Carroll observes, “the idea of a Gallic and a German nation is a 
Roman political and ideological construct.”154 The differences were less clear-cut than 
Caesar makes them to be. While Gaul was predominantly Celtic, a few German nations had 
settled west of the Rhine.155 It was natural for others to try to follow them. In much of Gaul 
the process of stable settlement and urbanization had progressed quite far.156 This was not 
the case east of the Rhine. Gaul thus was attractive. West-Rhenanian Germans and their 
Gallic neighbors maintained close relations across the Rhine. In particular, the Gallic Treveri 
frequently appealed to Germans for help or hired them as mercenaries in their fight against 
Caesar.157 Realizing that he could not possibly control large territories east of the Rhine, 
Caesar settled on a policy of deterrence and separation of Gauls and Germans along the 
150  Van Wees 2016: 34-35.
151  Thucydides 5.84–116.
152  Rosenstein 2006.
153  See also Weinstock 1971: 239.
154  Carroll 2017 (quote: 48).
155  2.3.4; 6.32.1; 8.7.5; 8.10.4 (although the latter could also refer to transrhenanian Germans). For discussion, see 
Carroll 2017.
156  See Büchsenschütz 2017; Ralston 2017.
157  5.27.8; 5.55.1–2; 6.7.1–9.2; 8.45.1.
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natural, though very porous, Rhine border.158 This artificial separation helped support his 
claim of having pacified “all of Gaul.”159
Ariovistus was a “condottiere” or warlord. Leader of the Triboci, he attracted 
followers from various nations, molded them into his own private army, hired out his services 
to Gallic leaders in their wars for supremacy, and then turned the tables on them, creating 
his own expanding fiefdom (centered in modern Alsace), where he was planning to settle 
the rapidly increasing number of his followers with their families. Allied with the Sequani, 
he gained a victory over their rivals, the Aedui, and exploited his power to appropriate large 
portions of Sequanian territory, while keeping the Aedui in check.160 He ended up being as 
unwelcome in Gaul as Caesar was. 
It seems strange that just a year before his confrontation with Caesar, when 
Ariovistus had long established his oppressive rule in southeastern Gaul, the Senate had 
recognized him as king and “friend of the Roman people”—upon the recommendation of 
the consul Caesar himself. Although being unresponsive to an Aeduan request for help in 
61, the Senate in 59 may have hoped that this prestigious status would deter Ariovistus from 
continuing to attack another Roman “friend,” the Aedui.161 Now, in 58, however, Caesar 
had developed his own Gallic ambitions and saw an advantage in containing and, when 
negotiations failed, expelling the German rival, thereby fortifying his position of power and 
patronage in Gaul.162 
By contrast, according to Caesar, the Usipetes and Tencteri were entire nations that 
migrated under pressure.163 Their intention too was to settle in Gaul, and some Gallic nations 
welcomed them—presumably hoping not least to use them as a potential reinforcement 
against Caesar.164 Cassius Dio claims that an invitation by these Gauls had encouraged the 
Germans to cross the Rhine in the first place.165 One would expect Caesar to mention this 
because it would have strengthened his case. If, as Cassius Dio also says, they had already 
entered the territory of the unreliable Treveri, Caesar had good reason to consider these 
Germans a danger to his efforts to consolidate his control over Gaul. At any rate, overall their 
role was similar to that of Ariovistus in that it was political: two large nations in one case, a 
coherent entity under a strong leader in the other, sought to settle on land taken in Gaul. 
Moreover, the Romans’ traumatic fear of German invaders, rooted in disastrous 
defeats suffered on the part of migrating Cimbri and Teutoni in 113–105 and invoked by 
Caesar several times, must have increased the army’s willingness to show no mercy towards 
Germans and provided Caesar with an additional excuse to do the same.166 Roman soldiers 
had also experienced the fierce warrior spirit of German women in two victorious battles 
against these Germans in 102 and 101.167 We can thus understand Caesar’s motives and 
the willingness of his soldiers to engage in wholesale massacre, but understanding does not 
require us to condone it.
158  Porous border: see previous note and 6.35–41.
159  A claim first raised in 57 (2.35.1) and 56 (3.7.1; 3.28.1); also 8.1.1. 
160  1.31–32. The victory over the Aedui at Magetobriga (1.31.12) dates to 61, at the latest. Ariovistus probably 
entered Gaul in 72–71.
161  The Aeduan leader Diviciacus had visited Rome in 61: 1.31.9; 6.12.5; Cicero, On Divination 1.90. Declaration 
as “friend”: 1.35.2. The issue came up in a parley between Caesar and Ariovistus: 1.43.4–5, 44.5. On “friendship” 
in Roman international relations, see Burton 2011.
162  The complaints of Gallic leaders (1.31–32) and the speeches at the parley between Caesar and Ariovistus (1.43–
45) are overdrawn but their essence is probably correct; the latter were heard by several witnesses. Contra (though 
extreme): Walser 1956: 8–20. Containment: 1.35.3–4, 43.9. 
163  See the beginning of this paper.
164  4.6.3–4.
165  Cassius Dio 39.47.1.
166  1.14.1–2; 1.33.4; 1.40.5; 2.4.2; 7.77.12–14.
167  Plutarch, Marius 19.9; 27.2–3.
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Both Ariovistus and the Usipetes and Tencteri are best described as harbingers of 
the much larger German migrations that threatened Roman frontiers from the mid-second 
century ce onward.168 Neither episode thus fits the pattern of migrations of large numbers of 
individuals (persons or families) without central organization or leadership and with entirely 
personal motives that haunt our own time. But the comparison is useful in making us think 
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